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Abstract
The contemporary info-proliferation is taking the ideal of a solid technological rationalism to its extreme point: the deple-
tion of all bodies into ’informational cuts’, orderable bits and pieces of data fabric. The present contribution will discuss 
this process of datafication, trying to avoid any polarization along the ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ dualism, and any consequent excess 
of enthusiasm or critique. For this purpose, the essay will take the form of a stroll across post-digital culture, alternatively 
under the effects of a ‘red and a blue pill’ as the two main points of view already exemplified, in 1999, by Morpheus in the 
famous sci-fi movie The Matrix. To these two points of view, respectively identifiable as digital critique (going down the 
deep rabbit hole, and seeing that computers are playing today a leading role in what Gilles Deleuze and Fèlix Guattari have 
called ’capitalist schizophrenia’), or digital potential (remaining in a world of numeric dreams, a world populated not only 
by humans but also by bots, autonomous computer programs that are becoming increasingly able not only to post, but also 
to understand content and interact with people and, most importantly, to take aesth/ethical decisions), a yellow one will be 
added, which can be recognized as that of ‘hacker culture’, at the same time suggesting that, instead of a dialectical contra-
position between two different perceptual and cognitive modalities, post-digital culture can be more easily discussed through 
a multiplication of possible perspectives.
Keywords Datafication · Post-digital culture · Capitalist schizophrenia · Algorithmic neurosis · Bots · Hacker culture
“A schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a 
neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch.”
1 Introduction
The contemporary info-proliferation is taking the ideal of 
a solid technological rationalism to its extreme point: the 
depletion of all bodies into ’informational cuts’, orderable 
bits and pieces of data fabric. Mirko Tobias Schafer and 
Karin Van Es have efficaciously described this ubiquitous 
’datafication’ as the abstraction “of all things under the sun 
into a data format” (2017). A process that is triggering sig-
nificant modifications in perceptual and cognitive habits, as 
it comes to coincide with an epistemological tendency to 
reduce the knowable physicality of the real to analyzable 
quantitative indicators, and to recur to a particular kind of 
images as their ’visual proofs’. Visible examples of this epis-
temological attitude are the omnipresent bars and pies, the 
arc and network diagrams that, on a daily basis, allow both 
the experts and the untrained to take the social and economic 
pulse of national and corporative bodies. The same attitude 
can also be thought under the frame of a mutating social 
relationality: if, as argued by Karin Knorr-Cetina (1997), 
human beings have long been displaced by objects as the 
main referents of social relations (a displacement that she 
defines as ’objectualisation’), it is possible to think data 
(and their visualisation tools) as the algorithmic objects we 
increasingly often relate to, in what could be defined as a 
new, overflowing ’digitactualisation’.
The diffused presence of quantitative data in our daily 
lives immediately suggests a compulsive appetite for num-
bers: it is the counter placed on top of the TV news screen, 
or the stream of percentages flowing under the presenter’s 
figure, that transmits to us the impact of phenomena such 
as violence against women, terrorist attacks, migration. In 
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the same way, it is only the erasure of all metrics from our 
Facebook account, that manages to produce a real change in 
our social media experience; at least according to Benjamin 
Grosser, the author of an artistic project called Facebook 
Demetricator, a web browser extension that hides all num-
bers from the Facebook interface, and whose aim is thus 
to “disrupt the prescribed sociality these metrics produce, 
enabling a network society that isn’t dependent on quantifi-
cation.”1 Are we all addicted to quantification then? Reading 
the project’s description on the artist’s site, is a little bit like 
hearing good, old Morpheus: do we choose the blue pill and 
go back to our numerical dreams, watching for the counts of 
responses, comments and likes, rather than for the ’responses 
themselves’, waiting for the number of friend requests to 
appear, rather than looking for ’meaningful connections’? 
Or do we decide to swallow the red pill, install Grosser’s 
software and stay in Wonderland, following the deep rabbit 
hole of the ’real’ (real connections, real responses, real rela-
tions)? Struck by the ’matrixial’ tone of the Demetricator, 
we wonder whether it might not be a better idea to instead 
erase the binary difference (that is still very active as an anti-
capitalist therapeutic strategy in cultural and media theory) 
between blue pill (a pathological trust in data, a compulsory 
implanting of algorithms everywhere) and red pill (a health-
ier attempt at going back to the real). In order for this erasure 
to happen, we should in fact first try both. The pills, in the 
end, are nothing less and nothing more than points of view 
on what we have defined as an increasing digitactualisation.
2  Red
2.1  Economic diagnosis
A world of paradoxes unveils itself in front of our eyes. 
As soon as we swallow the realist pill, we start to see that 
computers are playing today a leading role in what Gilles 
Deleuze and Fèlix Guattari have called ’capitalist schizo-
phrenia’. The paradox appears more clearly when the prolif-
erating and overflowing creativity that Deleuze and Guattari 
attribute to schizophrenia (and to capitalist societies), a crea-
tivity characterized by addition and accumulation, is thought 
of in relation to the rational simplifying capacity of binary 
algorithms (2000, p 6). From this point of view, the encoun-
ter between the sobriety of digital computing machines and 
the excesses of capitalism can also be defined as ’postdigital 
culture’, intending the latter as an obsessive repetition and 
accumulation of informational and algorithmic processes. 
The red pill, in other words, is showing us the evolution of 
the capitalist schizophrenia anchoring itself to the solidity 
of algorithmic procedures.
In 1972, Deleuze and Guattari’s diagnosis of capitalist 
schizophrenia already possessed the ambiguity of a para-
dox. As it was clear to the philosophers, the most insidious 
adversary in the political struggle of that time was not a 
totalitarian regime anymore (at least not in a pure monolithic 
form), but its adoption of a subtler sociocultural and psycho-
physical, strategic schizophrenia. The main symptom of the 
capitalist schizophrenic tendency was its ‘deterritorializa-
tion’, as the system started to avoid laws and limits, and to 
prefer “difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile 
arrangements over systems,” because “what is productive is 
not sedentary but nomadic” (Foucault in Deleuze and Guat-
tari 2000, p XV).
The very origin of capitalism as an economic system, as 
Deleuze and Guattari explain, is linked to the simultane-
ous liberation of different flows in a particular moment: “[f]
lows of property that is sold, flows of money that circulates, 
flows of production and means of production making ready 
in the shadows, flows of workers becoming deterritorial-
ized” (223). At the same time, the fluid that circulates on 
the deterritorialized field of industrial capitalism is nothing 
else than capital as re-investible money. When money begets 
money, capital becomes an independent flowing substance 
entering into relation with itself, rather than with its prod-
ucts.2 It is important to note that, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
the beginning of the capitalist regime cannot be defined by 
the predominance of commercial or financial capital yet, the 
latter being merely flows among flows; it is industrial capital 
that gives the regime its true schizophrenic nature, acting as 
a decoder and a recombinator of all the other flows (226).3
Bearing in mind Deleuze and Guattari’s description of 
the economic genealogy of capitalism, we can see how the 
conjunction of different flows that was necessary for the 
appearance and development of an industrial economy is 
today gradually fading away from the market’s own horizon, 
while the conditions that link capital to production, and the 
very meaning of production, have completely changed. To 
better grasp this shift, let us remember the distinction traced 
in the Anti-Oedipus between schizophrenia and neurosis as 
two expressive forms. The schizophrenic is nothing but a 
universal producer, an assembler of relations.4 Withdrawal 
1 https ://bengr osser .com/proje cts/faceb ook-demet ricat or/
2 And, according to the two philosophers, differentiating itself into 
an original value (advanced or invested money) and surplus value 
(profit), a differential relation that is also mirrored by that between 
exchange value and the power of capital.
3 The difference is between investment that increases capital stock, or 
production capacity, and an asset simply changing hands, or a simple 
manipulation of money.
4 Now, the question is: “How is it possible that the schizo was con-
ceived of as the autistic rag—separated from the real and cut off from 
life—that he is so often thought to be? Worse still: how can psychiat-
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from the world, detachment from the materiality of the real, 
exclusive focus on one’s own inner life, and incapacity to 
weave relations, constitute, on the other hand, typically neu-
rotic symptoms, or symptoms of repression. When looked at 
from this point of view, the financial market appears less and 
less schizophrenic, its purely numerical or computational 
flow incapable of establishing a non-exploitative relation 
with its own social and physical flows. The breath of living 
billions is captured by states of anxiety, depression, climate 
change, reminding us that there indeed is a body (or rather, 
more than one). But through a constant ‘acting as if’, the 
financial machine reaches its absolutization, unsticking itself 
from productive and consumptive processes, with a conse-
quent decrease in the significance of the ‘real’ economy, and 
an increased autonomy of derivatives.
2.2  Techno-logical diagnosis
Capitalism could in fact only see the light when the flow of 
capital was allowed to become abstract and more abstractly 
regulated (which does not in any case mean ’free’) by a 
’state’ (the modern political State as guarantor of the indus-
trial economic status). To understand the digital as a form of 
further economic abstraction, we should at this point remem-
ber that the digital is first of all a mode of thought based on a 
structuration of reality according to formal oppositions.5 In 
the seventeenth century, Gottfried Leibniz already thought 
that everything can be represented as binary mathematical 
information: by building one of the first computing machines 
in history, he could, therefore, deal with themes of complex-
ity and casuality, through the composition of 0 s and 1 s. 
Transducing the Leibnizian vision into the present, James 
Bridle argues that the digital space of 0 s and 1 s “is where 
we do our thinking, this notional space in which we imagine 
possible visions of the future…”.6
According to Luciana Parisi, digital information (data in 
the form of 0 s and 1 s) cannot be easily incorporated or 
used for functional human purposes, as it manifests a level 
of autonomy (2017). Nevertheless, despite the inevitable 
complexity and incompleteness of the computations, in the 
digital vision the obsession remains the same: everything is 
reducible to digital information, 0′s and 1′s. Being identifi-
able with Guattari’s definition of ’coding’, the idea behind 
computer processing is the direct translation of qualitative 
into quantitative values, an idea which the philosopher has 
defined as inherently “capitalistic due to the neutralization, 
the systematic dequalification, of the materials of expression 
from which [it] proceed[s]—which puts [it] into the orbit 
of the economic valorization of Capital, …” (1995, p 104) 
Furthermore, since most of the economic transactions on the 
financial market are currently being performed by or through 
these binary processors, the technological parameters of the 
machine (from programming languages to Internet proto-
cols) have ended up becoming the true decision-makers, 
in relation to the quantity and velocity of the transactions 
that can be, and are, actually performed. The main differ-
ence from industrial capitalism is, therefore, that, today, 
the social axiomatic is not given (or at least not exclusively 
given) anymore by a machine of control acting against the 
schizophrenic anarchy of capital (the State, the Bank, the 
Church), but by a technical machine of abstraction acting 
against the residual materiality of money (the processor). 
Technical machines are, therefore, no longer simply adja-
cent to bodies in the process of surplus value extraction (or 
abstraction): they are now also able to take the place of, or 
collaborate with, the repressive social code of capitalism, in 
enslaving those same bodies. A technological parasite that 
provides contemporary capitalism with forms of repression 
not simply aimed at the elimination of physiological schizo-
phrenia (as in nineteenth and twentieth centuries). Rather, 
the ’madness’ has now become part of the system, where it 
has evolved into the shape of a neurosis: data neurosis, algo-
rithmic obsession, a compulsion to create sense (and value) 
by abstracting, discretizing and quantifying. The diagnosis, 
5 A code (or a way to think) can be defined as digital when it is 
constituted by digits, countable units that can be related or opposed 
to each other (not necessarily in a binary way): a sort of perceptual 
and cognitive totalitarism composing the chaos of the real into an 
ordered formalism. This conception derives from Deleuze’s distinc-
tion between analog and digital codes, and his definition of the digi-
tal from digitum (the counting finger). In the book dedicated to the 
painter Francis Bacon, Deleuze discusses abstract painting as a form 
of artistic expression where chaos is eliminated, or reduced to its 
minimum, together with any form of tactile trace or manual craft: it 
is an ascetic art, an art of the spirit that goes beyond figuration, in 
order to reveal abstract forms. An art “without hands.” These abstract 
forms, in their turn, belong to a purely optical space. Abstract paint-
ing, in this sense, elaborates a symbolic code on the basis of formal 
oppositions. It is this code that the philosopher defines as digital: the 
digits, here, are the units which group the terms of the opposition in a 
visible space. With its simple codified oppositions of vertical-white-
activity and horizontal-black-inertia, Wassily Kandinski is mentioned 
as one of the main examples of this code: a conception of art based 
on binary choices (Deleuze 2005, pp 70–77).
6 https ://www.tumbl r.com/searc h/james %20bri dle. We can describe 
this process, by using the words of philosopher Alfred N. Whitehead, 
as “An abstraction arrived at by confining thought to purely formal 
relations which them masquerade as the final reality. … The concrete 
world has slipped through the meshes of the scientific net.” (White-
head 1968, p 18).
ric practice have made him this sort of rag, how can it have reduced 
him to this state of a body without organs that has become a dead 
thing—this schizo who sought to remain at that unbearable point 
where the mind touches matter and lives its every intensity, consumes 
it?” Or, in other words, “how does psychoanalysis go about reduc-
ing a person, who this time is not a schizophrenic but a neurotic…?” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2000, p 20).
Footnote 4 (continued)
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therefore, changes, from capitalist schizophrenia to neolib-
eral neurosis.
Under the red pill effect, it has thus become difficult to 
still agree with Franco Berardi, on the disappearance of neu-
rotic pathologies as vestiges of an old capitalism. The libera-
tion of flows of desire and flows of goods, and the replace-
ment of repression by ’simulation’ mechanisms are, for 
Berardi, what distinguishes the late ’semiocapitalist’ phase 
of immaterial labour and the explosion of the infosphere (the 
contemporary info-cracy) (Berardi 2007) Yet, the missing 
point in this theory is the digitalized abstraction of the capi-
talist productive machine into a form of data processing, and 
the consequent new form of subjective capture as a kind of 
quantitative narcissism. Events, in other words, do not have 
to carry semiotic signification anymore, but only quantita-
tive significance. This situation is not simply associated to a 
change of state in the capitalist market (from a flow of pro-
ductive money to a flow of self-replicating numbers), but is 
also affecting the epistemological environment of postdigital 
culture, by triggering new forms of numerical neurosis.
2.3  Technical diagnosis
In Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, we find the defi-
nition of technical machines as ‘indexes’ corresponding 
to general forms of production: “thus there are manual 
machines and primitive societies, hydraulic machines and 
“Asiatic” forms of society, industrial machines and capi-
talism” (Deleuze and Guattari 2000, p 32) Every political 
regime, according to them, is productive not only in a social 
and economic sense but also in a perceptual and cultural 
sense, as a way to see the world, a set of conditions through 
which particular notions of space and time are produced. As 
a technical dispositif that produces regimes of light (and, 
later on, of sound), cinema, for example, channels electro-
magnetic energy in a way that allows it to form images as 
serial assemblages of frames. Life as perceived and pro-
duced industrially, ’in series’.
What about the digital dispositif of the neoliberal, or 
financial, capitalist phase? Defined by Knorr-Cetina as a 
’synthetic situation’, the ubiquity of screens can perhaps be 
considered as one of the main technical assemblages char-
acterizing contemporary postdigital culture. Starting from 
the financial exchange market, where,
In doing deals, all traders on the floors have techno-
logical equipment at their disposal; most conspicu-
ously, up to five or more computer screens displaying 
the market and allowing trading to be conducted. … 
In this way, their bodies and the screen world melt 
together—an apparently total immersion in the actions 
in which they are participating (Knorr-Cetina 2009).
Beyond the realm of finance, screen ubiquity is a phe-
nomenological affect of all digitalized perceptual and social 
relations, as much of our interaction with things is via the 
screen. 
Screen ubiquity has not even spared the street and the 
physical activity of walking, as we continuously consult 
Google Maps for directions. The Maps software derives its 
data from the aerial and satellite observation of physical 
places. But once the data are acquired, they start to function 
autonomously from the material physicality of the Earth, and 
are projected using the formulae of the Mercator model, an 
unrealistic spherical model of the planet from which we end 
up obtaining our geographical information. The detachment 
of the software from the world and its bodies is often phe-
nomenally actualized by what we perceive as cartographic 
mistakes, which are often opposed by us to the ’healthier’ 
habit of relying on the ’here and now’ of real experience. We 
can imagine a theorist such as Elizabeth Grosz reminding 
the compulsory Map user that “Sensation [the here and now] 
includes not only the perceiving body but also the Umwelt 
in which the body moves through an ever changing horizon” 
(Grosz, 2008, p 72) The sensation of the ’here and now’, 
according to Grosz’s vision, does not coincide with the con-
sciousness of a human or technological subjective percep-
tion (which is dependent on the establishment of coordinates 
and abstract regularities), but is a sort of phenomenological 
equivalent of Morpheus’ red pill.
2.4  Historical diagnosis
’Dispositifs’, as Bernard Stiegler also points out, have a his-
tory (2005–2006). Much before the advent of cinema, picto-
rial representation constituted for example a potent machine 
that allowed people to produce particular visions of space: 
for archaic Romans, the symbolic representation of a genius 
loci, an animal or a human figure drawn or sculpted on a wall 
or a door, was a technical dispositif that allowed the singu-
larity of that place to emerge and to distinguish itself from a 
neutral space whatever (Dumèzil 1977). ’Seeing’ the genius 
meant being able to weave a relation with the environment 
and its unique properties, before converting it into the object 
of a subjective perception. It is evident how this worldview, 
based on the singular-neutral differentiation and on the val-
orization of the former, was in opposition with what has 
successively become the main conceptual presupposition of 
modern science (and of its technological dispositifs): that is, 
the belief in quantifiable, reproducible, foreseeable realities, 
and their preference over singularities.
What about the history of the various dispositifs attached 
to the digital worldview? We can go back in time to isolate 
some germs. We could certainly arrive to 1000 B.C. China, 
where the Yijing (or Book of Changes, a classic divination 
text based on a binary combinatorics of hexagrams) was 
Author's personal copy
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written by the first kings of the Zhou dynasty (and only in 
the seventeenth century translated into a European language 
by Leibniz, who took it as the basis of his binary numeri-
cal system). Or we could get to ninth century Baghdad, 
where the Persian mathematician, astronomer and astrolo-
ger Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi published a new 
system for solving polynomial and quadratic equations: alge-
bra, thus giving his name (Latinized into Algorismus by his 
translator Gerard of Cremona) to sequences of mathematical 
instructions. Furthermore, a look at the architectural and 
urban structures of traditional African settlements would 
show us that geometrical fractals were known and applied 
much before the advent of computer graphics. But certain 
particular tendencies of contemporary postdigital culture 
also seem to retrospectively point towards another, impor-
tant predecessor.
As a guide in this temporal journey, we can again follow 
Deleuze: on the 14 and the 21 of March 1978, the philoso-
pher gave two seminars on Immanuel Kant at the University 
of Vincennes-St. Denis.7 For Deleuze, the modernity of Kant 
resided in his conception of space (as well as time) as a 
noumenon, a knowable and measurable extension composed 
of parts: what this means is that every spatial quantity is 
at the same time conceivable as a multiplicity and a unity 
(a unity of multiplicities), a multiplicity being a gathering 
of parts into a whole. The concept of extensive magnitude 
appeared thus as one of the transcendental tools to purify 
reason from the contaminations of subjectivity, to restore its 
objective universality. A pure reason which laid down the 
laws of human knowledge but also, according to theorists 
such as Achille Mbembe and Denise Ferreira da Silva, the 
metaphysical basis for the ’modern’ exclusion of particu-
lar, ’other’ subjectivities from the anthropocentric ideal of 
thought (Mbembe 2017; Ferreira Da Silva 2007).
In the Kantian image of a universal human reason, space 
and time are the objects of a non-empirical intuition (rather 
than sensation). Insofar as it appears ‘in’ space and time, the 
real, or the phenomenon, the experientable, acquires a meas-
urable extension (for example the space of a room floor). 
Since, as demonstrated by many after Kant (and Descartes), 
no element of our experience can be said to really possess 
this extensive calculable character in itself, we can only 
arrive at realities such as precisely located bits of mate-
rial, or numerically definable instants, through a process of 
abstraction.8 Empty space and time become thus two abstract 
neutral extensions purified of the loci’s divinity and only 
graspable by the modern human mind.
The Kantian notion of extension makes us catch a glimpse 
of a particular conception of space and time: digital geom-
etry as a study of space as composed of discrete information 
sets, and of time as ’bit time’, or ’flick’. It is at this point 
worth remembering how early sci-fi representations of the 
‘digital world’ were very much in tune with this Kantian 
conception, when they made the space of computers ’appear’ 
to human eyes for the first time. In 1982, cyberpunk writer 
William Gibson for example introduced, in his novel Neu-
romancer, the notion of cyberspace: “Lines of light ranged 
in the nonspace of the mind…”.9
Kant’s space is not an object of experience but an inde-
pendent a priori that applies to it. It is a condition of possible 
experience, of the whole of possible experience, or rather 
the very locus, where the conception of a whole becomes 
possible despite the fragmentation and difference of expe-
riences, precisely thanks to such pretense of a universal 
condition. Before being experienced, this transcendental 
condition lays down the foundation for a phenomenology 
of perceptual and motor processes (for example, for seeing 
and walking), identifying the movement of the human body-
subject as an exploration and cognition of that space which, 
as often argued, has been de-materialized and dis-oriented 
by technological interventions.
After the initial, disorienting appearance of a digital 
space, various images and metaphors offering a lexicon of 
place (verbs such as ‘enter’, ‘exit’, ‘explore’, nouns such as 
‘space’, ‘highway’, ‘channel’) were provided, to allow users 
and readers to visualize an otherwise imperceptible, unliv-
able electronic reality, and to redefine it in phenomenologi-
cally familiar terms: “Here-now. … You can conceive of two 
objects, whose concept is strictly the same, there are still two 
objects, for this very reason that the one is here and the other 
there. … There is a spatio-temporal order irreducible to the 
conceptual.”10 The phenomenological conception of this 
spatial metaphor is, therefore, founded on the same dualism 
7 http://deleu zelec tures .blogs pot.com/2007/02/on-kant.html.
8 The definition of particular entities as calculable units, separate 
extensions, or spatially and locatable points, is in fact what White-
head defines as abstraction: for the philosopher, the distinction 
between what is abstract (facts of the mind) and what is concrete 
(physical reality) is of fundamental importance, and failure in doing 
so amounts to a “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” As he argues, 
“among the primary elements of nature as apprehended in our imme-
9 As evidenced in Lakoff and Johnsons theorizations on metaphors, 
the latter are often conceived as spatial physico-conceptual devices 
(such as the simple association ‘up is good, down is bad’ and the con-
sequent equation of uprightness with consciousness) (1980).
10 See Deleuze’s lectures on Kant.
diate experience, there is no element whatever which possesses this 
character of simple location…. I hold that by a process of construc-
tive abstraction we can arrive at abstractions which are the sim-
ply located bits of material, and at other abstractions which are the 
minds included in the scientific scheme. Accordingly, the real error 
is an example of what I have termed: The Fallacy of Misplaced Con-
creteness.” (Whitehead 1967, p 58). From this point of view, the main 
question to be explored is to what extent digital technology can also 
be said to be a mind.
Footnote 8 (continued)
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that animated Kant’s transcendentalism: the physical and 
the digital, as two different and separate kinds of space, in 
need of a connection.
In our time, the modern ‘on-line off-line’ dichotomy 
seems to have been amply demystified, together with all 
metaphorical dualism between physical and cyber space, 
demonstrating how the two spaces are enmeshed, and reveal-
ing us our own profound sympathy for a class of new objects 
native to the twenty-first century. So how does seeing, or 
thinking, like a computer really feel? A tentative answer 
could be: in spite of everything, it still feels very Kantian, 
or very anthropomorphic. The software of ARGUS, a video 
surveillance machine attached to an unmanned UAV (a soft-
ware called Persistics after the concept of persistent ISR—
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), perceives 
by drawing a colored box around humans, cars, and other 
objects of interest. With an imaging unit that totals 1.8 bil-
lion pixels, the drone captures pictures and video (12 fps) 
that are ’detailed enough to pick out birds flying through 
the sky, or a lost toddler wandering around’.11 In a Kan-
tian terminology, we can say that the visual representation 
constructed by ARGUS is the result of a double process of 
‘apprehension’ (the positioning of reality as occupying a 
certain space and time) and ‘reproduction’ (the linking of 
the preceding parts to the following ones).12 More precisely, 
the Kantian faculties of apprehension and reproduction are 
directly correspondent to the two main features of ARGUS’ 
perception: location, as a precise tracking on a spatiotem-
poral grid, that is the transformation of everything into a 
datum; and the reproducibility of the datum ad infinitum 
through the causal logic of algorithmic processing, whereby 
every output depends on a previous input. But even more 
than apprehension and reproduction as the two perceptual 
modes delineating the Kantian imaginative synthesis real-
ized by the digital dispositif, it is the unity of this synthesis 
according to an a priori category, that makes of digital per-
ception a transposition of Kant’s transcendental humanism. 
(Deleuze, 1984, p.15) Seeing pixels, faces, things or, which 
is the same, seeing objects in coloured boxes: a cultural atti-
tude with Kantian origins.
According to Benjamin Noys, recognizing the Kantian 
origin of digital perception allows the drone to inhabit a met-
aphysical field, and to embody the dream of transcendence 
that has always haunted the Western imagination (2015). 
From this point of view, the abstract objectifying percep-
tion of drones comes to coincide with the metaphysical pro-
ject of Kant. But, Noys suggests, endowing the drone with 
ontological agency flatters the device as an object, allowing 
it to elevate itself beyond the mere fusion of human flesh, 
cybernetic weapon and imperial apparatus that it actually is. 
And yet, the human agency that directs the drone’s percep-
tions, movements and actions is also a peculiar kind of sub-
ject, as “these humans are constituted in ways to make them 
resist calls on their humanity and … are called to conform 
to the drone. (…). The achievement of a final ‘subjectless-
ness’ of the human is not simply the effect of an automation, 
but a labour by the human that operates in the process of 
self-automation, or the creation of an ‘automatic self’.” If 
it is now possible to identify software with the incarnation 
of contemporary reason, this identification simultaneously 
pushes the very limits of human subjectivity towards the 
most rationally Kantian idea, through its automation and 
perceptual abstraction.
3  Blue
3.1  Infinite potential
The blue alternative does not make us perceive the paradoxi-
cal, but rather, the potential side of digitalization. We will, 
at this point, draw on the cosmology of Alfred N. White-
head, as one of the possible sources from which it could be 
possible to grasp the virtuality of a computer’s algorithmic 
pixellated vision: the basic stuff of which the whole universe 
is made, Whitehead tells us, is not constituted by isolated 
bits and pieces (such as atoms or pixels) but by relations, or 
networks of bits and pieces (1985). According to Whitehead, 
we often like to talk of ’this’ or ’that’ entity (a computer, a 
pixel, an algorithm, a human eye, an image), but we should 
remember that everything is ‘relationized’, and each entity 
can only be comprehended as a cluster of relations. On one 
hand, thus, we have the ontological primacy of relations over 
parts; but on the other hand, relations appear as relations 
between parts. How can this (onto)logical contradiction be 
solved and, more importantly, how can the solution be rel-
evant for a definition of the digital potential?
For Whitehead, it is the infinite potential divisibility 
(rather than the actual finite division) of the world into parts 
(for example into bits of data) that allows relations to take 
place: thanks to this divisibility, the world can become an 
extensive continuum, or “a common world with mathemati-
cal relations” (Whitehead, 1985, p 62). The infinite divis-
ibility of matter into wholes and parts is like a prepixelation, 
a sort of potential digitalization of the world. Only after 
we have thought this potentiality as a tendency of matter 
towards infinite division (or ’cutting’), we can understand 
how this potential becomes actualized in the digital cut as 
a concrete experience of the technological assemblage. In 
fact, the generation of finite actual patterns from a virtual 
11 https ://www.extre metec h.com/extre me/14690 9-darpa -shows -off-1-
8-gigap ixel-surve illan ce-drone -can-spot-a-terro rist-from-20000 -feet.
12 For a deeper exploration of Kant’s notions, see Deleuze (1984, pp 
1–17).
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infinity is, for Whitehead, much more interesting than infin-
ity in itself: experience is all that there is, and it is never 
infinite (Whitehead cited in Jones 2010).13 This means that 
a conceptual valuation of the digital as a radically empiri-
cal potential should take us from its infinite virtuality, to its 
capacity of curing the transcendental sense of infinity by 
generating experience.
As Lev Manovich already stated in 2012, we can “expect 
that the number of photos uploaded to Facebook daily is 
larger than all artifacts stored in all world’s museums.”14 
How can an image be selected, or even just made out, as a 
finite pattern in this infinity? Creative composition has today 
come to coincide with curation. The coincidence becomes 
mostly evident when artists use mainstream user-generated 
content as the primary subject matter of their work (see 
Richard Prince’s New Paintings, as a specific chapter in the 
history of ’appropriation art’).15 Which means that artists, 
increasingly often, create in the same way as social media 
users do, by “gleaning interesting images from Big Data, as 
algorithms and robot eyes spew out images by rates as high 
as 30 frames per second in some cases, which makes images 
akin to grains of sand on the aesthetic beach. But the New 
Aestheticist strides upon that beach, picking out a sparkly 
grain of sand or even the occasional diamond, ready-cut, 
and places it in their bucket (Tumblr, Pinterest) to show to 
other people on the beach. … Lots of data; lots of sand.”16 
The cure cannot but be curation: on the Big Data beach, 
according to Patrick Lichty, the image creator or composer 
becomes a collector, an aggregator, a fetishizer of autono-
mous operations performed by someone (or something) else, 
a “drone aestheticist.”17 A New Aestheticist.
In 2011, London-based designer James Bridle launched 
“The New Aesthetic.” Sharing the online space of this blog 
with pics and videos of the latest games used for anti-ter-
rorism and anti-crime training, or with smart city visuali-
zations, the first images to be posted were examples of a 
visual style that expressed the digital through physical mate-
rials (such as the printing of pixilated imagery on fabrics). 
Bridle’s New Aesthetic Tumblr is, in other words, nothing 
more than an incessant flow of images whose only ’cura-
torial’ logic is that of ‘being digital’: a machinic criterion 
that replaces sensation (the aesthetic quality of an image) 
with function (its technical digitalization), in the name of a 
mutual sympathy between ‘us humans’ and ‘them technolo-
gies’. It is now the machine that, with its own categories 
and parameters, looks at the world and gives it a sense. Our 
initial question about how the virtuality of the digital can 
generate experience, has thus flown into a human/machine 
decisional alternative.
3.2  Decisional potential
If the role of the human was already put into question by 
the first calculating machines (such as Leibniz’s digital 
computer), the latter were in fact still seen as mere labor-
saving devices replicating complex but tedious computa-
tions, while the very production and functioning of these 
machines required more specialized, intellectual human 
labor (Betancourt 2013). With a significant shift, digital 
computers have acquired today the capacity to automate 
most cognitive tasks, even aesth/ethic ones. New Aestheti-
cists have recurred to various theories to respond positively 
to this shift. Among the preferred theories, we find Bruno 
Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, a theoretical vision that is 
very popular among New Aestheticists, particularly because 
of its will to go beyond an anthropocentric vision, and 
beyond the human individual as the only possible intentional 
agent of a decision. The decision, from an ANT’s point of 
view, would actually be neither human nor technological. As 
argued by Latour, “Instead of opposing the individual level 
to the mass, or the agency to the structure, [ANT] simply 
follow[s] how a given element becomes strategic through 
the number of connections it commands and how does it 
lose its importance when losing its connections” (1996). 
Translated into the New Aesthetic’s idiom, this principle 
has been transformed into an algorithmic criterion of choice, 
where the decision about what to publish is based on the 
proliferation of numerical relations (for example, number 
of attracted clicks). It is the algorithmic subject that, finally, 
takes the decision.
Algorithmic calculation can also be defined as the most 
concrete actualization of that rationally thinking (and decid-
ing) subject that has been haunting Western culture for cen-
turies, at least since the Enlightenment. This subject is not 
13 “We cannot understand the flux which constitutes our human expe-
rience unless we realize that it is raised above the futility of infinitude 
by various successive types of mode of emphasis which generate the 
active energy of a finite assemblage.” (Whitehead in Jones 2010).
14 Reading the NYTimes, we see that “Just as access to pens and 
paper hasn’t produced thousands of Shakespeares or Nabokovs, this 
explosion of camera phones doesn’t seem to have led to more Doro-
thea Langes or Henri Cartier-Bressons. But it has certainly led to 
many more images of what people ate at lunch” (Estri 2012).
15 http://www.richa rdpri nce.com/paint ings/.
16 Lichty, Patrick. Article not available anymore.
17 “Curation in the age of social media must be made to include the 
posting of photos and videos to social media, with the gesture, con-
stituting the greatest number with the least investment (the function 
of the Long Tail’s power curve—# involved vs. degree of investi-
ture). This lower stratum from the pin board to the Like is the beach 
to which I allude earlier, with New Aestheticists doing slightly more 
than Liking an image by taking the time to find it and put it on their 
Tumblr, hoping for a Like. But with the rise of art-based Internet 
Surfing Clubs like NastyNets and Double Happiness in the 2000′s, 
the aggregation of images of interest have become a function of 
quantum-level curatorial practice at the base of the saddle of the Long 
Tail. But perhaps NA is a form of curation for the masses, a folk cura-
torial practice for cyborg times.” (Lichty).
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defined by Brian Massumi in its human but, rather, in its 
’machinic’ character, working as a ’live-wire technology’, an 
abstract machine for cutting decisions into a continuous flow, 
and for making something determinate emerge out of the 
potentials mutually included in the oscillations of thought 
and sensation (2015). The potentials are always more than 
a subject can rationally arrive to think of, and constitute a 
complex virtual field of metastable states to which the sub-
ject is (and remains) affectively linked before, throughout, 
and after the decision. From this point of view, it becomes 
evident how reason owes its positive, or ’decisive’, nature, 
precisely to what eludes it: a constitutive immanent field 
open to all kinds of oscillatory processes. The nonconscious, 
field-induced nature of this cybernetic decisional machine 
is certainly not to be interpreted as a mere passivity on the 
part of the subject but, more interestingly, as its autonomi-
zation or, in other words, a form of nonhuman thinking and 
’decisioning’ in autonomy from subjective consciousness.
But what happens when an algorithm, as foreseen by New 
Aesthetes, decides? On one hand, the oscillatory character 
of the human decisional machine as described by Massumi 
seems to be in contradiction with the main capacity of the 
technology, which is to cut a decision in the quickest pos-
sible time, therefore (apparently), leaving complexity out 
of the process. But on the other hand, according to Parisi, 
examples such as RankBrain (an algorithm that supports the 
Google ranking software in dealing with long and complex 
search inputs) show that algorithms are becoming able to 
activate a level of inference or complex reasoning, to fab-
ricate long series of hypothetical conjectures, and to learn 
from uncertain or incomplete information (Parisi 2017, p. 
10). We can also think of Creatism, another deep-learning 
Google algorithm that is capable of creating professional 
photographic works from StreetView images.18 If, ‘humanly 
speaking’, the selection of what is considered to be a good 
image usually happens according to aesthetic criteria, Cre-
atism breaks down these criteria into a series of numerable 
features to be looked for, each feature to be learned in its 
turn from a vast dataset of photographic examples. Trans-
forming aesthetics into a mathematical operation that can be 
efficiently optimized (for example, through the ’Dramatic 
mask’ tool, an operation that improves dramatic lighting 
in a photo), the algorithm is thus compelled to continually 
re-learn to choose and adjust, each time from an increased 
quantity of data or database images.
And yet, despite all this complex deep-learning, and in 
spite of the algorithmic capacity to deal with the errors, ran-
domness and imprecision implied by huge amounts of data, 
a difference seems to persist: thinking of Massumi’s argu-
ment, we see that what algorithms lack is the simultaneous 
coexistence of all the potentials that constitute a ‘living’ 
field of decisional complexity, and that the software can only 
process sequentially, or in parallel, due to its discrete nature. 
For Parisi, on the other hand, this persisting difference is 
not to be read as a lack on the algorithmic side, but as the 
sign of a peculiar fact: indeterminacy lies at the core of the 
techno-logic not as a kind of irrational (or not yet rational) 
immediacy with an outside, but as a superposition of levels 
of rationality and mediated thinking, and as the establish-
ment of “new chains of reasoning that draw from the minute 
variations of data content.” (2017, p. 8)
At this point, reconnecting the discussion to the problem 
of curatorial decision and image selection, Deleuze’s words 
come to mind: a selection, or a perceptual cut, in the infin-
ity of the visual field, can only emerge along the lines and 
contours of an idea. It is the idea (intended by Deleuze as 
a differential of thought) that operates the decision, instead 
of a preconstituted human or digital subject: an image is 
chosen neither by a human nor by a computer’s intention, 
but by an idea affirming itself autonomously.19 Only an idea 
can curate the visual infinity of the postdigital neurosis. 
This definition of ’idea’ might sound here controversially 
transcendental. But it should be remembered that, for both 
Whitehead and Deleuze, the notion of ’idea’ does not derive 
from the necessity for an extra-experiential concept of the 
understanding, and does not imply the imposition of any 
pre-existing Category: to the contrary, the idea is like a form, 
a model derived from reality itself. For example, according 
to Whitehead, red should be defined as that eternal object 
(or idea) which allows a series of physical relations between 
atoms and molecules to be identified as ONE coloured spot 
(a red chair) by a perceiver. Thanks to the idea of red, an 
image can stand out as ’this’ and not ’that’. It is the form of 
the objectification of an actual entity for another, the form 
that a relation between ’two’ can take to generate a ’one’, a 
relation between many but also a detachment, a separation 
from another many.
The digital certainly has an ‘ideal’ origin, in the sense 
that, as Gregory Chaitin reminds us, the computer emerged 
first of all as an idea, an eternal object, or a digital differen-
tial of thought (2005, p XIII). In this sense, by following the 
logic of an algorithm, every digital machine, be it a CCTV 
camera or a flying drone, actualizes a simplified version of 
the real through calculation: an eye that is simply guided by 
a mathematical idea. Since it is the idea that takes the deci-
sion, determining its own path and literally choosing where 
to go, it is important to note that the digital idea has today 
decided to follow the direction of contemporary capitalism.
18 https ://googl e.githu b.io/creat ism/.
19 On the notion of the idea as a ’differential of thought’, see Deleuze 
(2001, pp 168–221).
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In the postdigital visual continuum, we are thus perceiv-
ing a fading out of the idea as ’humanly shaped’ (or, to put 
it in Whiteheadian terms, of the eternal object as qualita-
tively realized by an image), and a becoming indiscernible of 
images themselves. But the sense of ephemerality associated 
to this disappearance and indiscernibility is in fact generated 
by the stubborn persistence of a human attitude towards the 
idea (the red pill effect). Under a ’blue’ point of view, on 
the other hand, it appears that what we are being confronted 
with is nothing less than a paradigmatic shift, a change of 
criteria that is not only affecting aesthetics and art, but vari-
ous cultural environments of digitalization. As an example, 
we can think of phenomena of online mass curation, such as 
the ephemerality-based website 4chan.org, where one of the 
statements most frequently given by its participants or ’cura-
tors’ does not offer any comment on the beauty of the posted 
image, on its political importance, or on any other subjective 
judgement of interest or taste, but simply the expression “I’ll 
just leave this here.”20 ’This’ might very well be ’that’; if it 
was not for the counting of the clicks already and potentially 
attracted by the image; a numerical judgement that associ-
ates the capacities of a human curator to those of a bot. This 
association appears, in the online ecology of bots, like a sort 
of extreme actualization of Kant’s extensive propensity; the 
propensity that appears not only, as stated by Kant in his 
Critique of Judgement, when we think that shape and rhythm 
are more important than colour and tone, but also when we 
imagine the ‘Konigsberg Clock’ counting the steps of his 
daily walking routine.
3.3  Learning potential
Like most social network environments, 4Chan is populated 
not only by humans but also by bots, autonomous computer 
programs that are becoming increasingly able not only to 
post, but also to understand content and interact with peo-
ple.21 If, on one hand, the automatization of tasks entrusted 
to bots can still appear as the neurotization of a Kantian 
anthropocentred phenomenology, and if the programming 
of the algorithm is nothing more than a manifestation of 
human thought obsessed with itself and incapable to over-
come its limits, the development of a capacity to distinguish 
the human from the technological transforms the algorithm 
itself into an example of what is generically defined as 
‘machine learning’. At a basic level of machine learning, 
the algorithm’s technique for distinguishing living from non-
living online presences consists in isolating a few properties 
for each account (such as name length, account age, retweet 
frequency) and in crossing these properties among the dif-
ferent account instances to be analysed. In fact, the resulting 
model has to often be applied not to a few but to millions 
of accounts, which means that it will need to work with 
always new incoming information. But it is here, among 
the complex operations performed on massive quantities of 
data, that algorithmic cognition reveals another aspect of its 
Kantian lineage.
As argued by Deleuze in his Vincennes seminars, Kant’s 
real modernity did not simply reside in the conception of a 
metric-able abstract space filled with objects. Whereas in 
classical Western philosophy the ’magical’ relation between 
the spiritual and the earthly had always been a true paradox 
or a strange, inexplicable equilibrium between transcenden-
tal and physical planes, what made Kant’s thought mod-
ern was its capacity to conceptualize not only the dualism 
between the abstract metric extension of a measurable space 
and the objects dwelling in it, but also the intensity of expe-
rienced phenomena.22
It is in an ’intensive’ sense that machine learning can 
also be defined as Kantian. Cara Emotion Recognition is 
a system for facial detection and semiotic analysis that can 
be programmed to interpret a person’s mood.23 Like most 
machine emotional intelligence systems, Cara identifies a 
face as object-in-space, to then proceed to identify the emo-
tions that intensively fill up that same face-as-space. In this 
space, the algorithm learns to ’sense’ the emotional intensi-
ties that show up in the micro expressions of the face, by 
metrically analysing the relations between different points 
(mouth angles, nose tip, eyes), and by then linking these 
data to the categories listed on a database. We are, in other 
words, still presented with an extensive capture of intensive 
phenomena.
But an algorithmic processing of intensity can extend 
itself, from the extensive individuation and recognition 
of emotions on a human face, to the actual registering and 
20 https ://www.urban dicti onary .com/defin e.php?term=I%27m%20jus 
t%20goi ng%20to%20lea ve%20thi s%20her e.
21 https ://www.4chan .org.
22 We have seen how, for Deleuze, “The Kantian theory accord-
ing to which intensive quantities fill up, to varying degrees, matter 
that has no empty spaces, is profoundly schizoid.” (Deleuze 1984, 
p 19) “One world of mere appearance, and the other world compact 
of ultimate substantial facts.” This simple relation of material real-
ity ‘filling’ abstract space characterized Kant’s topology as unilateral 
and unidimensional, a straight topology where space becomes a pure 
universal parameter subject but indifferent to the empirical variables 
of the reality that fills it. While Leibniz’s topology considered spa-
tial determination as conceptual (two forms are superposable because 
it is not their position in time and space that counts, but a concept), 
Kant’s synthetic judgment is like a rule for all possible content, a rule 
of construction (example: a straight line is the shortest path between 
two points). Differently from extensive measures such as lengths and 
volumes, intensity is not given by a sum of successive parts but is 
apprehended in one instant, because the rules of addition and subtrac-
tion are not valid for it.
23 https ://www.kairo s.com/intro ducin g-cara.
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measurement of intensive quantities filling up the material 
environment. On January the 8th 2018, FLIR Systems, Inc. 
announced the availability of a high resolution Thermal 
Vision Automotive Development Kit featuring a Boson 
thermal camera.24 In other words, an infrared camera help-
ing self-driving cars to ’see’, and move, during the night, or 
in other difficult situations like sun glare or fog. The infra-
red light emitted by objects in view is scanned by infrared-
detectors that obtain temperature information (thermogram), 
and the information is transduced into electric impulses. 
The final phase is the appearing on the display of objects or 
bodies with different colour tones according to the intensity 
of the infrared emission. According to Kant, “One cannot 
give an exhaustive mathematical description of an object 
by appeal to its size and shape alone”, because two bod-
ies can have the same size and shape but differ in density 
or, in other words, they can contain different quantities of 
matter (Jankowiak 2013). In this sense, the metaphysical 
concept persisting behind unmanned crafts that are able to 
spot and identify objects in a visual field, is complemented 
by the thermal camera’s capacity to ’sense’ the objects’ 
intensive quantities of heat and matter. In the experience 
of the infrared camera, Kant’s ’degrees of reality’ become 
thermograms.25
As a sensing material capable of registering variations of 
temperature, the thermal dispositif has in fact a much older 
technical genealogy than that of digital algorithms. From 
Galileo’s experiments with air and water to the testing of 
semiconductor metals in the twentieth century, temperature 
degrees have always already been measured in analog ways. 
But what makes digital thermal cameras and sensors really 
interesting is their use in autonomous vehicle computing 
platforms as vision enhancers. Here, the learning process is 
not undergone by the camera or the sensor in itself, but by an 
Intel Movidius Myriad 2 Vision processing Unit, an embed-
ded computer processor that analyses the data provided by 
the sensor and makes predictions/takes decisions about the 
car’s movement in the street. The deep-learning algorithms 
composing the cognitive neural network of an autonomous 
car are thus able, in their own way, to develop an intuition 
of continuity, or of continuous quantities, in a mathematical 
rather than a physical way. So how can Kant’s philosophy of 
intensive, continuous magnitudes retrospectively shed light 
on this kind of deep-learning algorithms?
3.4  Curving potential
For Kant, perception is not enough to describe the phenom-
enology of experience, but we need to consider the ways in 
which the empirical reality of the senses comes to form con-
scious knowledge, through what he defines as a ’synthesis 
of the productive imagination’. In the cognition of qualities, 
between the pure 0 and the 1 of reality, an infinite sequence 
of degrees is in fact possible, each degree constituting the 
intensive magnitude of a different qualitative sensation. 
Qualities, in other words, are ’known’ by the subject through 
the calculus of an infinitely small differential, an ’intensive 
unit’ that can only be abstracted by imagining the possi-
bility of a continuous change from one degree to another. 
Every colour has a degree which, however, small, is never 
the smallest; the same goes with warmth. Rates of change of 
qualities are intensive, and we can algebraically translate this 
philosophical concept by saying that the derivative (curve) 
of a function represents an infinitesimal change with respect 
to the considered parameters.
The calculus of differentials is applied in mathematics to 
find the extrema of functions, whereas integral calculus is 
used for probabilistic modeling. Coming back to our autono-
mous car system and its traffic scene problem, we understand 
that such system requires the deployment of processes much 
more complex than the pixel-level extensive identification of 
objects in the street. The street becomes a data space, a set of 
points potentially linked in many possible ways: people, ani-
mals, other cars, buildings and objects as potential movers or 
obstacles, each with a trajectory that represents a problem to 
be solved. The system has in fact to take into account a mul-
tiplicity of internal and external data that are visual, ther-
mal, acoustic, and then to use them to predict eventualities, 
evaluate possibilities, and obtain the best possible action 
model (calculus of an integral). This calculus takes the form 
of a ’gradient descent’ in which a deep-learning algorithm 
learns from progressively incoming data: modeling the best 
guide action coincides, from the algorithm’s point of view, 
with finding the line (or the derivative curve) that combines 
all the data-points (extrema of movement) coming from the 
outside, with the smallest margin of error, according to a 
non-crash parameter. In this process, the derivative of the 
sum of all possible mistakes is used to update the system’s 
parameters and make error decrease at each new information 
input, so that after every update, the system learns to predict 
with a lower error margin. Until, after running many itera-
tions, it converges around an optimal solution.
The complexity of this kind of reasoning, the delineation 
of error gradients from infinitesimal changes, the search for 
an integral line or curve across myriads of data-points, con-
stitute the intensity of deep machine learning. This intensity 
can be philosophically connoted through a Kantian defini-
tion according to the principle of intensive magnitudes as 
24 http://inves tors.flir.com/news-relea ses/news-relea se-detai ls/flir-
relea ses-high-resol ution -therm al-camer a-devel opmen t-kit-0.
25 Since sensory matter (the matter perceived by the senses as colour, 
acoustic tonality, warmth, etc.) constitutes the most basic human rep-
resentation of objects, the ’continuous’ or intensive magnitudes (or 
quantities) of this matter are to be considered as phenomenologically 
basic.
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a line curved by infinitesimal degrees. But a deeper look 
into the genealogy of calculus as an algorithm’s learning 
criterion, shows us that what Deleuze defined as the most 
modern dimension of Kantian thought, that is its capacity 
to delve into the infinitesimal shifts of the physical world, 
emerges from the discussions about infinitesimal and differ-
ential calculus that were already quite frequent and popular 
by the time the Critiques appeared. In his book The Fold, 
Deleuze traces a deviating philosophical curve from the 
Kantian lineage of modernity, and extensively comments 
on the modernity of Leibniz as a Baroque philosopher and, 
more importantly for us, as the mathematician who, already 
in the seventeenth century, introduced calculus to the Euro-
peans (1992). An underdeveloped concept in Kant’s work, 
perhaps exactly because of its modern way to represent the 
most obscure, microscopic and infinitesimal parts of con-
sciousness. The modernity of calculus is in fact starting to 
re-appear now, while the human programming mania gives 
space and autonomy to the calculating intensity of algo-
rithms, and to a less fixed and immutable idea of software. 
But we could extend the genealogical curved line of this 
modernity further back in the past, making it deviate from 
Western media philosophy and history, and land sometime 
after 996 in Cairo, where Abu Ali al-Hasan al-Haytham (also 
knows as Alhazen), a Persian mathematician associated with 
the University of al-Azhar, was already able to integrate (cal-
culate) fourth-degree polynomials.
3.5  Yellow
Entering a neurologist’s studio, an autistic child sees hun-
dreds of neural maps and brain models aligned on the doc-
tor’s desktop screen, like the inert flowers drawn and listed 
on a botanist’s catalogue.
In their essay “Coming Alive in a World of Texture. For 
Neurodiversity,” Massumi and Erin Manning suggest a dis-
tinction between two modes of perception: on one hand, an 
immersive ’environmental awareness’ that feels the sur-
roundings as a complexity of relational variations, or as a 
qualitative diagram, a landscape of sensations (a modality 
that the two thinkers show to be proper of so-called ’clas-
sical autists’) (2014). In this perceptual modality, a whole 
field has to be taken into account, in which a flower is not yet 
seen as a detached object but is felt as a conduit of relation, 
a sign of the field’s tendency to express itself. A field full 
of ’budding’ objects emerging at the boundary, or as relays, 
between experiencing and imagining. On the other hand, we 
find a subtractive kind of perception which is, by contrast, 
proper of neurotypicals, a perception that extracts discrete 
objects and positional griddings from the complexity of the 
outside (following the static model of a map). “Neurotypical 
experience,” in this sense, “tends immediately to align to the 
beyond of the associated milieu of relation, to an ulterior 
phase in which the flower stands alone, a solitary object 
separate from its shadow stories” (Manning and Massumi 
2014). An experience perfused with ’for-ness’, as it follows 
a tendency towards the use-value of expression, rather than 
following expressibility on its own account. A separation of 
the object from the background, a cutting out of the flower-
image in the experiential flow. Nevertheless, as Deleuze and 
Guattari might put it, neurotypicality and autism are not to 
be interpreted as the representatives of ’normality’ and 
’deviation’, but as the two actualizations of a unique image-
production process which can take variable extremes: from 
a botanical portrait to a garden composition. As Manning 
and Massumi also underline, neurotypicality and neurodi-
versity should not be seen as constituting “a dichotomy, but 
as a polarity governing a continuum of variable intermixing 
between the modes.” Relationality and codification are, in 
this sense, two coexisting tendencies in the perceptual pro-
cess, differently highlighted or peripheralized by different 
experiences: perception is, in fact, a matter of degrees and 
mixtures of the two, rather than of healthy or pathological 
identifications.
When looked at from this double point of view, contem-
porary postdigital culture seems to reveal, in its multiple 
digitactualisations, a sort of data/rhythmic neurosis, or in 
other words an increasing tendency to objectivize percep-
tual physicality, and to quantify reality into data models 
to be algorithmically processed by binary computers. The 
same kind of vision encountered by the autistic child on 
the neurologist’s computer desktop, was perhaps encoun-
tered by artist Salvatore Iaconesi after being diagnosed with 
brain cancer. After a period of tentative treatments, Iaconesi 
decided to leave the hospital, and to place all medical data 
about his tumor (from scans to reports) on a website called 
La cura (“The Cure”), together with a request for possible 
’cures’ to be proposed by the online community.26 Address-
ing peers, activists and designers all around the world, he 
asked them to engage with the data and to produce a cure. 
Thousands of different propositions arrived, in forms as 
diverse as medical advice and poetry. In the Cure perfor-
mance, in other words, Iaconesi did nothing else than ’open 
source’ his cancer, transforming it into a trigger of collec-
tive action. The visualizations of Iaconesi’s cancer and brain 
inspired many different productions, all focused around the 
concept of resisting, or reinventing, the patient’s condition. 
In this sense, Iaconesi and Delfanti argue, “the opening up 
of cancer’s “source code”” becomes “a biopolitical rite of 
healing, aimed at redefining concepts like “disease” and 
“cure”” (2016).
After trying both the red pill (unmasking a suffocating 
bodily reality concealed by a thick veil of digital numbers) 
26 http://la-cura.it.
Author's personal copy
 AI & SOCIETY
1 3
and the blue one (understanding that datafication requires 
a shift in our aesth/ethical paradigms), Iaconesi’s project 
thus calls on us to try a yellow pill. As in the chromatic 
scale, the yellow does not represent a dialectical synthe-
sis between two opposed alternatives, but a hint of infinite 
multiplication of the points of view. This third pill can actu-
ally be identified with the perspective of hacker culture: a 
pill for techno-socio-cultural decentralization, and for the 
expropriation of data controlled by institutions. Iaconesi’s 
The Cure, in fact, initiates an online ritual that “follows a 
protocol or script which derives from hacker practices and 
rhetoric” (Delfanti and Iaconesi 2016). The first step in the 
performance was a technical one: to convert the medical 
records from professional to common standards, making the 
data easily readable and shareable by everyone. The cure, in 
other words, was possible thanks to a transduction between 
technological standards. While, for medical institutions, a 
brain scan represents an instrumental, objective abstraction 
from the individual body, its transduction and its ’opening 
out’ to the online open-source community extends its sig-
nificance and its range, also repositioning the brain-object 
into a wider perceptual and social environment. The brain 
can thus be brought back to its collabor(rel)ational social 
field, where it appears as an actualization of the field’s (in 
this case, the social field’s) tendency to express itself. The 
yellow pill, in other words, allows us to focus, as if under 
the effect of a ’neuro-diverse’ perception, on the imaginative 
“biodigital rituals of sharing” that are intricately woven to 
our scientific and technological experiences. Open access 
to data and tools, the cracking of institutional and technical 
protocols, and the free circulation of digital artefacts, com-
pose thus a techno-active substance that would be certainly 
worth exploring further.
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